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Walmart’s Sustainability Journey: Defining Sustainable Products (A)
It was July 2008 in Bentonville, Arkansas. Matt Kistler, Senior Vice President for Sustainability
at Walmart was reflecting on his first year in the job, and more particularly the challenge of
selling sustainable products, one of Walmart’s three broad sustainability goals. He already had
concluded that the goal of selling sustainable products was unobtainable unless Walmart could
find a better way to define, measure, and communicate about environmental standards. It needed
a credible, science-based system to support any product environmental claims—otherwise the
company could be accused of greenwashing when trying to achieve its goals.

In many ways, developing such a system was similar to any other classic make-or-buy decision.
Walmart could develop its own standards in-house or go to the open market to purchase or
license an existing set of standards. Other advisors suggested a third option: participate in a
multistakeholder effort, open to all firms, to develop public standards. This intriguing option
could address the inherent problems of credibility and capabilities that Walmart would face if it
moved alone, but it also raised some new and serious concerns.

Kistler and his team spent nearly a year evaluating the benefits and drawbacks of the three
options: make, buy, or collaborate. Ultimately, though, Kistler must decide which direction to
take. Should Walmart establish a new set of product standards in-house, buy or license an
existing set of standards on the open market, or lead a collaborative effort to develop public
standards, together with other large corporations and stakeholder groups?
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Walmart and Sustainable Products
Walmart’s product sustainability efforts began in 1989, with an early and unsuccessful effort to
introduce environmentally friendly products identified by green-colored shelf tags.
Environmental advocacy groups attacked the company and its suppliers, asserting that some of
the products simply did not live up their environmental claims.i That strategy was ultimately
abandoned, yet in 2004, when Sam’s Club buyer Coral Rose purchased organic cotton yoga
outfits, they were wildly successful with customers. As Walmart CEO Lee Scott recognized,
“We gave our customers something they wanted, but something they might not have been able to
afford at specialty stores.”ii That consumers were interested in affordable, sustainable products
became a critical point in the company’s nascent product sustainability strategy. As Kistler
remarked, “It has democratized sustainability—customers should not have to pay more for
products that are better for their families or the environment.”iii

On October 24, 2005, CEO Lee Scott gave a pivotal speech—“Twenty First Century
Leadership”—that called for an expanded effort to make Walmart an environmentally
sustainable company. He set out three aspirational and broad goals: (1) to be supplied 100% by
renewable energy; (2) to create zero waste; and (3) to sell products that sustain resources and the
environment. To achieve these goals, Scott asked company strategist Andy Ruben to become the
first Vice President of Strategy and Sustainability, and Ruben had worked with senior staffers
such as Tyler Elm and Janelle Kearsley to form 14 boundary-spanning, cross-functional
“sustainable value networks” (SVNs), focused on different dimensions of the three goals.

These networks were meant to integrate sustainability within and across the business units, to
emphasize that sustainability was more than just a corporate function. The sustainability office
primarily guided and coordinated activities that were initiated through the networks and business
units. The SVNs extended beyond the boundaries of the company to include supplier firms,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), regulators, and other stakeholders. Of the 14 networks
established, 7 were specific to sustainable product development: Jewelry, Seafood, Food and
Agriculture, Chemicals, Wood and Paper, Textiles, and Electronics. The Packaging network
related mainly to waste but also had clear ramifications for product sustainability.iv As the SVNs
came into being, Ruben suspected that unless the company could find a way to measure product
sustainability, it could not make sufficient progress toward meeting its goals.
Page 2

Defining Sustainable Products

Not that they weren’t progressing at all: Walmart had significant successes in the highly
publicized introduction of CFL light bulbs and All Small-and-Mighty® condensed laundry
detergent, and had made significant commitments and progress in organic cotton and certified
seafood. Walmart had just announced a partnership with CI to certify a line of jewelry, known as
the Love, Earth collection, with criteria that addressed environmental, human rights and
community issues. Sam’s Club had introduced a range of gourmet coffees with three different
certifications: fair trade certified by Transfair (Fair Trade); responsible harvesting certified by
the Rainforest Alliance; and organic certified by the USDA. The coffee beans were roasted by
Café Bom Dia, a Brazil-based company that was the world’s first CarbonNeutral® coffee
roaster.

But focusing on individual products or categories was different than creating a measurement
system that could be leveraged to provide a consistent framework for assessing the relative
sustainability of all the products that Walmart sold. Accordingly, for Kistler, who took over for
Ruben in the fall of 2007, this measurement issue became central to making product
sustainability real.
The Demand for Environmental Standards
In his first months on the job, Kistler learned that progress on the sustainable products goal was
lagging behind Walmart’s progress on energy and waste. Perhaps even worse, it had become
painfully clear that there was no definitive way to measure this progress. The challenge of
figuring out what counted as a sustainable product crystallized for Kistler when he asked
suppliers for proposals for a 2008 Earth Day promotion. They responded with such a range of
product sustainability claims, across so many dimensions (e.g., reduced packaging material,
percentage recycled content, use of non-toxic ingredients, product recyclability) that Walmart
could not arbitrate effectively among the competing claims. Even a committee of external
thought leaders rarely agreed in their advice. As Kistler recalled:
We were doing the circular for Earth Day and were struggling to figure out which
products to put into the circular—which ones were truly “green.” And we were
wracking our brains over what qualified. So we ended up creating a council of
elders—a leadership council of NGOs and academics to vet the products that the
merchants had given us. It was after that we realized we must have a science-
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based tool—this council approach was not going to work. We were going to get
labeled as greenwashers—it’s just not scientific.
The lack of understanding of how to evaluate product sustainability claims had already led to
some embarrassing promotions—one Walmart flyer cited Campbell’s Condensed Soup as a
sustainable alternative, simply because it was condensed.v (See Exhibit 1.) This choice generated
some external criticism and accusations of greenwashing, pointing to a fundamental problem in
terms of achieving the stated goal of sustainable products: No one had a clear idea of what
constituted a sustainable product, yet increasing consumer interest compelled firms to make
environmental claims. Because there was no commonly agreed-upon standard for measuring
sustainability, a proliferation of measurement models, usually product or vendor specific, were
emerging that often promised some type of certification. (See Exhibit 2.) These conditions often
led to “ecobabble”—a profusion of environmental claims that led to consumer confusion over
what any particular product claim, standard or certification actually meant (e.g., “natural”). (See
Exhibit 3.)

To cope with these challenges, downstream companies often sought to add validity to their
environmental claims by using extensive scorecards, which they expected suppliers to complete.
Walmart’s suppliers complained that other retailers issued different assessments and scorecards;
even worse, they pointed to variation in Walmart’s own scorecards. With this proliferation of
sustainability measurement tools, even representatives of the NGO community expressed
concerns that neither companies nor customers could be sure what each one represented or whom
to believe. As Miranda Ballantine, Director of Sustainability, described the situation:
We were hearing more and more from our suppliers that they received the
Walmart sustainability scorecard, but they were getting asked roughly the same
questions, but in slightly different ways, dozens of times from their different
customers. And even within Walmart, we had developed a lot of scorecards.
We’ve got the supplier sustainability assessment. We’ve got a packaging
scorecard. We’ve got a program called GreenWERCS, which assesses chemical
intensive products. I’ve heard concern from the NGO community about how
we’re implementing those tools and that there’s too many of them.vi
The lack of standardized methods to measure the relative sustainability of a product was more
than a theoretical problem. It was an effective barrier to Walmart merchants, and it was creating
a substantial reputation risk. Kistler was acutely aware that greenwashing—that is, misleading
publicity or propaganda designed to present a false image of environmental responsibility—
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might be a strategy adopted by some of Walmart’s suppliers (or its suppliers’ suppliers), which
posed a risk not just to the supplier firms but to Walmart as well. Consumers and government
agencies that regulate advertising seemed increasingly skeptical of environmental claims, which
could mislead by focusing on narrow product attributes. Increases in supply chain transparency,
mostly afforded by the Internet, also meant that even seemingly innocuous claims (e.g., the
Campbell’s Soup Earth Day promotion) could produce substantial negative publicity. The
company’s credibility could be damaged by accusations of greenwashing, even if there had been
no intention to mislead. Just as the lack of good information prevented accurate measures of
sustainability, it hindered Walmart’s ability to respond to greenwashing accusations.
The Search for Standards
To address the emerging problem of measuring sustainable products, Kistler and Rand
Waddoups, Senior Director for Strategy/Sustainability, had already begun a systematic,
comprehensive exploration and analysis of standards and other measurement systems, including
existing environmental standards in the marketplace. (See Exhibit 4 for a sampling of the
standards reviewed.) Waddoups reported on the first steps of the search process:
We began having conversations with a lot of different groups. For instance, we
talked to Goodguide and others that were doing projects similar to what we were
contemplating. We even talked to Metacritic—the people who figure out how to
rate a movie by analyzing all of the critical analyses that’s been done for that
movie.vii
They first explored standards in the NGO community because of that sector’s presumed
credibility and independence. They met with organizations like the Carbon Disclosure Project
(CDP), the U.S. Green Building Council, and its Leadership in Energy and Environmental
Design (LEED) committee. They interacted with industrial ecologists who used life cycle
assessment (LCA) databases. One promising model was Earthster, an open source software
platform for sharing sustainability information across supply chains. It had been developed by
the New Earth NGO lead by LCA expert Greg Norris. Earthster provided a means for suppliers
to enter detailed, proprietary data (e.g., energy inputs) about their products, which was then
converted into nonproprietary data—to overcome resistance to sharing data. And there were
others, too. As Waddoups described, “we went through a broad list of NGOs to try to find
someone who had this competency for measuring sustainable products.” Always, the Walmart
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team asked: “How do you measure? How do you create a system to gather all the data? How do
you create something that can turn that into a measurement?”

They also moved beyond the environmental community to explore how other industries
addressed collective standard setting. For example, in meetings with representatives from the
software industry, they learned innovative ways to create virtual communities focused on
building common knowledge bases. They met with people from Wikipedia, Metacritic, CSA
International, Microsoft, IBM, and others. And these meetings revealed to the sustainability team
that Walmart faced several distinct problems. First, it needed data that its partners likely
considered propriety, so it had to come up with incentives to encourage individual firms to
participate, as well as achieve sufficient credibility to allow them to provide that information.
Specifically, Walmart would need to conceal or transform any proprietary data, using a score that
could be shared, as well as verify the accuracy and credibility of the process and the data.
Second, once it collected all these data, Walmart had to decide what to do with them. As
Waddoups explained:
We always had the same two questions: One, how do you gather and purpose
data? How do you do it in a way that is really efficient and effective? Two, once
you get all that data, how do you purpose it to ensure that you will actually get
value from it? Because an enormous amount of data will be useless unless you
can extract value.
But as the search continued, few comprehensive solutions arose for measuring product
sustainability. Waddoups reported: “We struggled to find someone who could really help us do
this; but increasingly we realized that the solutions we saw were only different parts to the
puzzle—there was no holistic solution.” For example, the Carbon Disclosure Project was an
exceptional standard but still had significant limitations: It only addressed carbon, and in a
limited way. The Environmental Working Group (EWG) had developed SkinDeep, but that
system emphasized chemical toxicity. The system that was the closest to what Walmart was
looking for was GoodGuide, which came from a company founded in 2007 by Dara O'Rourke, a
professor of environmental and labor policy at the University of California, Berkeley. According
to Waddoups, “GoodGuide was much more holistic, but it did not meet our criteria for
transparency.” The mechanisms by which the scores were calculated for a particular product
were not disclosed, likely because that disclosure could allow firms to manipulate the inputs to
influence their scores. Data behind these scores came from more than 1,000 sources, including
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the media and companies that manufactured the products rated, but also included scientific data
if available. GoodGuide thus remained a serious consideration, because of its LCA approach and
aspirations for transparency; however, Waddoups also found that GoodGuide had concerns about
Walmart’s own long-term commitment to transparency.

Government, a traditional purveyor of standards (e.g., nutrition labeling), was of yet little help in
defining the sustainability of products. Following a decades-long emphasis on “end-of-pipe”
regulations to deal with waste management, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was
shifting its focus to materials management with life-cycle approaches.viii In addition, the EPA
seemed to have no more knowledge of product sustainability than industry. For its developing
strategy, the governmental agency would rely increasingly on business to provide sustainability
solutions around materials management. The NGO community also appeared open to
collaborating with business to produce environmental outcomes that would be precursors to
effective regulation. Once NGOs demonstrated that an environmental improvement was not
harmful to business, then they could be more effective in advocating for regulatory change.
Kistler and Waddoups thus were becoming convinced that a single standard did not currently
exist, and business would need to provide the solution.
Designing Environmental Standards
Waddoups had worked with Jib Ellison and John Buffington of Blu Skye, an environmental
consultancy, to form a steering committee of prominent sustainability thinkers, including
representatives of the Environmental Defense Fund, Conversation International, Rocky
Mountain Institute, University of Arkansas, Arizona State University, and General Mills.
Beginning in March 2008, the group met three times to explore how Walmart could build a
credible index to measure the sustainability of products.

The steering committee recommended that Walmart pursue a system that was both transparent
and based at least in part on international standards, such as the science-based life cycle analysis
(LCA) for environmental metrics. A starting point was the International Standards Organization
(ISO), an international standard-setting body composed of representatives from various national
organizations that promulgates worldwide commercial and industrial standards. According to
ISO, LCAs represent the “compilation and evaluation of the inputs, outputs and the potential
environmental impacts of a product system throughout its life cycle,” including information
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about raw material acquisition, transportation and manufacturing, energy use and efficiency, and
end-of-life recycling, disposal, or repurposing. (See Exhibit 5.) LCA was central to the ISO’s
protocol for business-to-business communications about product environmental impacts, such as
carbon emissions and water usage, because the LCA framework supports the development of
common metrics that can be scored and compared. For Walmart, the construction of a LCAbased index would provide standards against which they could evaluate their progress in selling
sustainable products.

When the Walmart team hosted the Sustainability Index Summit in July 2008, it hoped to
broaden the conversation and explore with stakeholders how to create such an LCA-based index.
Walmart representatives described the broad need for product sustainability, outlined its own
research, and proposed an approach. The participants, including 145 suppliers, NGO participants,
and academics, settled on “four buckets that an index should address: natural resources, energy
and climate, material efficiency, and people.” As Waddoups described the outcomes:
We ended the last day with three key insights. Generally, we had a much keener
perspective on how little knowledge existed about building an index such as we
were contemplating. As such, there were no easy starting places. But first we
realized we had to start with the supplier and understanding supplier sustainability
at a macro level. Second, we should then focus on categories and understanding
by category where the hot spots are and how we develop better insights to
improve at the category level. Third, we should focus on individual products, how
they score, how one product scores versus other products.
Supplying Environmental Standards
The meeting produced some valuable outcomes, but Kistler still confronted a number of
questions. Should Walmart lead in the development of standards for product sustainability? If so,
how? Should it buy an existing standard and adapt it to its needs or develop its own standard inhouse? Or should it work collaboratively to seek a comprehensive solution in tandem with other
large corporations and stakeholder groups? And if it chose to collaborate, how much should
Walmart contribute in terms of effort and funding? To analyze these questions, three dimensions
needed to be considered: capabilities, credibility, and competitiveness.
Capabilities
Kistler and Waddoups had learned a lot about measuring product sustainability. They also had a
better sense of what they didn’t know. Their experiences in their own Earth Day promotions and
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the outcomes of their search efforts convinced them that no one had all the answers. The science
was not there, and neither was there agreement on the fundamental assumptions of what a
sustainable product was. There was no comprehensive solution, only fragmented approaches
(though some of them were quite good), and most solutions referred to single or related product
categories (e.g., seafood, forest products). As a big box retailer, Walmart needed to measure in
multiple dimensions across multiple categories in multiple markets. Thus,
The more we explored, the more we discovered that there are resources,
beginning points, but we needed so much more. How were we going to measure
water and the importance of water? What’s the difference between water in waterstarved regions in India versus water in North Dakota, where they’ve got plenty of
it? How do you deal with the differences in geography and the real impacts
associated with decisions you have to make?
Complicating the situation was the nature of the information that would provide the basis for any
comprehensive system. Such information came from complex, global supply chains and was
very difficult to obtain. Few products in the global marketplace were sourced, manufactured,
distributed, consumed, and disposed of in a single country. As a retailer, Walmart would need to
amass comparative information on many products, and there was no way to sort out all the
information without the help of other firms. But it would require substantial market power to
compel others to provide information. As Waddoups realized, “there are lots of metrics programs
in use or being developed, and lots of big companies are working on this problem; but these are
all bodies in random motion. Walmart can establish orbits.” Walmart’s huge size and scope
might move supply chains around the world in a manner that other retailers could not, but
undertaking such an endeavor in-house required a set of capabilities that Walmart did not
presently possess. Waddoups believed that defining standards simply was not a core competence
Walmart could easily leverage: “We’re a retailer and building an index is not our core
capability.”

The decentralized sustainability function in Walmart also meant there would be significant
organizational implications for developing an index in-house. It would be necessary to bring in
scientists to work on LCA and other environmental and social dimensions that would be
incorporated into any proposed standards. Just as problematic, Walmart would have to verify any
data it managed to collect and incorporate into an index. How could it determine if suppliers
were providing correct information? Or suppliers’ suppliers? Taking responsibility for the
accuracy of the information it presented to consumers would necessitate Walmart to be certain of
Page 9

Defining Sustainable Products

the veracity of the information it received, an accomplishment that would require significant
investment in new capabilities and relationships.
Credibility
The credibility issue was two-pronged: the credibility of the index and Walmart’s own
credibility. How would consumers, suppliers, competitors, and other stakeholders react if
Walmart created an index? A private standard, just for Walmart suppliers, would make the effort
vulnerable to claims that Walmart was using scientific standards that only fit its agenda. Even if
the sustainability office could operate an index fairly and transparently, outside observers had no
reason to believe it. To outsiders, the credibility of an index or certification depended on a
multistakeholder process for developing the standard.

At the Sustainability Index Summit, Kistler asked two academics, Jon Johnson of University of
Arkansas and Jay Golden of Arizona State University, to develop a proposal for a university-led
effort that would involve industry and stakeholders:
I asked Jon and Jay for a statement of work—what it would take to create an
index? I think of colleges and universities as being ‘neutral.’ If an index like this
comes from any particular sector—like business, NGOs, or government—then it’s
unlikely that the other sectors will see it as credible. So universities are the closest
thing I know to an unbiased, science-based source.
One alternative was to employ watchdog organizations that would audit the index metrics, but in
that case, the certification might be suspect due to potential conflicts of interest. It also implied
higher costs, which would allow competitors to make competing, unaudited claims at lower
costs. And if no other firms followed, there was no reason for anyone to believe that Walmart
was really doing better for the environment.
Yet Walmart’s credibility also was at risk if it failed to act. In his 2005 speech, Lee Scott said
that every company had a responsibility to reduce greenhouse gases as quickly as it could.
Although an index might help that effort, Scott had not mentioned it explicitly. Instead, in a
reflective moment in 2006, Scott hinted at the greater responsibility associated with being one of
the world’s largest companies:
If we had known ten years ago what we know now, what would we have done
differently that might have kept us out of some of these issues or would have
enhanced our reputation? It seemed to me that ultimately many of the issues that
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had to do with the environment were going to wind up with people feeling like we
had a greater responsibility than we were, at the time, accepting.ix
Competitiveness
Walmart had already learned that collaborating with competitors and suppliers was an excellent
way to bring innovations to scale faster by lowering costs common throughout the industry, such
as energy. It was not competing on electricity costs, so if common solutions could be found that
lowered everyone’s cost, then everyone gained. As Kistler described it, “Sustainability is
something that Walmart has always shared. We share scorecards, we share information, we
invite everybody to participate, we work with the other retailers—it’s always been a very
collaborative approach.”

But was collaborating on product standards different? The company did compete on product
characteristics. Ultimately, the creation of a sustainability index was a public good that would
benefit many firms, as well as the environment. If established collectively and openly, no single
organization would enjoy an initial competitive advantage, which made this scenario a “precompetitive” space. That is, no one could compete on environmental standards before the
competitive criteria were defined. Waddoups summarized the collaborative advantages and
tensions of developing a collective index: “How could we create an open environment where we
can make world a better place, but through collaboration also create the incentive structures to
drive the right behavior?”

A key challenge revolved around information disclosure. Some firms were concerned about
possible negative outcomes if they participated in a collective effort to build and maintain a
meaningful index. Waddoups paraphrased Walmart suppliers’ concerns: “I’m not giving
Walmart any product information. Why would I give Walmart more information than absolutely
necessary if they are just going to use it against me?” Kistler believed though that suppliers could
supply the necessary the data without revealing proprietary information, even if creating the
incentives for firms to participate would require developing collective rules and trust over time.

A second set of issues pertained to who would develop and run the index. Kistler worried that
the introduction of many players into a collaborative effort to build the index might slow down
any efforts to introduce collective standards. For example, multiple actors with diverse interests
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and perspectives engaged in a complex decision-making process might lead to stalemates rather
than innovation. Even if excellent incentive structures and decision-making processes could be
developed, someone would still have to pay to build and maintain the index. It was difficult to
estimate the total cost, but even conservative estimates suggested tens of millions of dollars.
With regard to funding scenarios, “ultimately, for big companies, we all need the same thing so
why don’t we work together?” Kistler thus suggested that there should be an “opt-in” system led
by Walmart, such that “others could use it if they wanted to, but you would benefit because you
would be in the driver’s seat and you would have it first.” The “early adopters would win
because they would be able to use the information.” But he also noted the tension between who
pays and who benefits:
First of all, funding the index was inconsistent with the principles of sustainability
of Walmart. We couldn’t invest unless it paid back to the business. And I couldn’t
justify tens, twenties, or thirties of millions of dollars to do this work because the
payoff, quite frankly, would not be there for us, ever, in most of the areas. In
some areas it might because of efficiency, but not most of it. The people who
stood to gain most were the manufacturers—it wasn’t the retailers. If they can
make the products more efficiently, they can save money. And so why we would
not want them to invest in tools to help them do that? Ultimately though, the
consumer wins because we were the catalyst.
Kistler believed there were both moral and practical issues to consider when it came to the
question of whether the company had a responsibility to make the index public:
Consumers are increasingly requiring that companies be responsible for the
products that they make and sell. Companies need to do the right thing, and we
would rather be the company to drive the change for good than one that rode in
the backseat. It’s the better story to tell. And from a business standpoint, if you’re
driving the change, you’re gaining efficiencies and reducing costs faster than
others. At the same time, it is a collective good for the entire industry, similar to
packaging changes. Packaging changes that a manufacturer makes for Walmart
tend to ripple through the entire supply chain. We win, and our competitors win
too. We know that by reducing packaging, by improving energy efficiency, our
competitors gain the same advantages. But ultimately, its consumers we really
care about, and the consumer wins regardless.
Defining Sustainable Products
Kistler reflected back over the past ten months and what he and his team had learned. He and
Waddoups agreed that the problem seemed pretty straightforward at first: “The ultimate question
around products is: One: what is a more sustainable product? Two, how do you know if it is
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that?” But the current environment for measuring product sustainability was fragmented. There
were multiple ways to measure sustainability and none of them was comprehensive or spanned
multiple dimensions and product categories. The development of corporate standards for product
sustainability therefore represented a watershed in Walmart’s efforts to sell sustainable products.
Without credible and measurable standards, it would be difficult to evaluate progress toward this
stated objective. Yet, if Walmart were to move alone in developing its own proprietary
standards, others might doubt the veracity of its claims, even as Walmart was investing in
developing capabilities that it did not currently possess.

If Walmart instead collaborated to develop a public standard, it would face a different set of risks
and returns. In particular, a collaborative strategy raised challenging issues associated with the
relationship between sustainability and firm-level competitiveness. The benefits of a public
standard were likely to accrue across many firms and stakeholders, but many would look to
Walmart to bear the costs and risks of leading such a collaborative effort. Any direction chosen
would lead to difficulties. But Kistler also knew he and his team had to move quickly on their
make, buy, or collaborate decision, otherwise they would need to scale up the product-level
approach that had been successful so far if they wished to measure product sustainability across
the full range of categories that Walmart sold. Either way, accelerating product sustainability at
Walmart was a goal that could not wait.
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Exhibit 1. Earth Day Promotion for Campbell’s Condensed Soup
Photo courtesy of
anonymous blogger
accusing Walmart of
greenwashing. The
blogger noted that the
green cans were not
available from a
regular grocer but only
appeared at Walmart.
Another blogger added
that only the label was
different; the same
product had been
condensed since 1897.

Source: http://www.awdsgn.com/dailyjournal/mar08/html/dailypg_033008.htm. Downloaded July 2012

Exhibit 2. Sample Certifications

Source: Images courtesy of Flickr user Paul Kim. Downloaded July 2012
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Exhibit 3. Ecobabble
What do these claims
really mean, especially
to consumers? The
vast number of
certifications imply
more rigorous
assessment but still
can be confusing.

Slide excerpted from presentation shown to merchants April 2007, courtesy of Walmart

Exhibit 4. Index Summit: Diverse Approaches

Source: Slide excerpted from presentation shown at Sustainability Index Summit, July 14–16, 2008. Courtesy of
Walmart.
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Exhibit 5. LCA Model

Source: Image courtesy of EPA, Melissa Winters. 2010. Product Category Rules and Environmental Product
Declarations. EPA.
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